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KEEPING OUR GUNS IN OUR PAST 
 
Logan Youngworth-Wright 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Second Amendment protects the right of “the people” to keep and bear arms,1 and 
it has long been considered “the palladium of [all] liberties …. ”2  But for most of America’s 
history, the scope of the Second Amendment has been hazed in constitutional mystery.3  Since 
its ratification in 1791, Second Amendment jurisprudence has been deficient at best.4  Before 
2008, the Supreme Court has only directly addressed the scope of the Second Amendment 
once5 in United States v. Miller.6  The Miller Court held that the Second Amendment protects 
the right to keep arms that are reasonably related to the preservation of the militia. 7  But, the 
Miller Court did not rule on whether the Second Amendment protects an individual right or a 
collective right to keep and bear arms.8  More than seventy years after the Supreme Court 
decided Miller, the Supreme Court finally answered the fiercely debated question of whether 
                                                 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. II. (“A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of 
the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”) 
2 St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States, in 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES WITH 
NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA ed. app. at *300 (St. George Tucker ed., Lawbook Exch. 1996) 
(1803). 
3 Andrew R. Gould, Comment, The Hidden Second Amendment Framework within the District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1535, 1536 (2009) (explaining the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Second 
Amendment). 
4 See generally United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); Miller 
v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894); Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1 (1920); United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 
(1939). 
5 Gould, supra note 3, at 1542.  
6 Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (holding that the National Firearms Act of 1934 did not infringe on the de fendants’ 
Second Amendment right to bear arms because there was no evidence to suggest that possession of a sawed -
off shotgun was reasonably related to the preservation of a well -regulated militia).   
7 Gould, supra note 3, at 1543 (summarizing the Supreme Court’s holding in Miller). 
8 Id. 
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the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and bear arms in District of 
Columbia v. Heller9 and McDonald v. City of Chicago.10   
In Heller and McDonald, the Supreme Court announced that the Second Amendment 
protects a pre-existing, fundamental11 “right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms 
in defense of hearth and home.”12  But, the Court did not purport to define the entire scope of 
the Second Amendment,13 and it did not adopt a standard of review for Second Amendment 
challenges, although it did reject both an interest-balancing approach and rational basis review 
as the appropriate standards of review.14  The Court warned that the right to keep and bear 
arms is not unlimited,15 and it left it to future cases to “expound on the historical justifications 
for the exceptions”16 to the scope of the Second Amendment.  Since Heller and McDonald, 
there has been a significant effort to expand the scope of “the people” protected by the Second 
Amendment to include persons who have not been traditionally included in the definition of 
“the people.”17  The lower courts have been grappling with the Court’s holdings in Heller and 
McDonald in an attempt to set limit the scope of the Second Amendment.18  The lower courts 
have consistently resisted the effort to expand the scope of “the people” to include 
                                                 
9  554 U.S. 570 (2008) (5–4 decision). 
10 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (5–4 decision). 
11 Id. at 778. 
12 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
13 Id.  
14 Id. at 628 n.27; 633. 
15 Id. at 626–27.  
16 Id. at 635 (“[S]ince this case represents this Court’s first-in-depth examination of the Second Amendment, 
one should not expect it to clarify the entire field …. [T]here will be time enough to expound upon the his torical 
justifications for the exceptions we have mentioned if and when those exceptions come before us.”).  
17 See generally James Lockhart, Annotation, Construction and Application of United States Supreme Court 
Holding in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008), That Second 
Amendment Confers Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms to Federal Statues Regulating Firearms and Other 
Weapons, 56 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1, 3 (“Since the Heller decision was rendered, a large number of cases have 
discussed whether and to what extent it affects the validity of various federal laws affecting firearms and other 
weapons including, but not limited to, provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968 and the National Firearms 
Act of 1934, portions of which impose restrictions not specifically referred to in the Heller Court’s list of 
presumptively valid regulation[s].”). 
18 Id. 
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undocumented aliens, but recently the Seventh Circuit forfeited. 19   In August 2015, the 
Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Meza-Rodriguez,20 held that undocumented aliens are part 
of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment, and the court granted undocumented 
aliens within the territorial jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit the right to keep and bear arms.  
The Seventh Circuit’s holding demeans the Supreme Court’s authority as the supreme 
interpreter of the Constitution, and it undermines Congress’s plenary power over immigration. 
Immigration law is an anomaly to constitutional law—Congress’s plenary power over 
immigration is not enumerated in the Constitution, however, it is immune from judicial 
review.21  In Chae Chan Ping v. United States,22 the Supreme Court established Congress’s 
plenary power over immigration.  The Court explained that Congress derives its plenary 
power over immigration from Article I, Section 8, Cl. 2 of the Constitution, which empowers 
it “[t]o establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization … throughout the United States …[,]”23 
and from the penumbras of its enumerated powers to “declare war, make treaties, suppress 
insurrection, repel invasions, regulate foreign commerce, secure republican governments to 
the States, and admit subjects of other nations to citizenship….”24  Justice Field, writing for 
a unanimous Court, stated that it is the inherent right of every independent sovereign to 
exclude foreigners, and Justice Field explained that if a nation could not regulate its borders 
and exclude foreigners then it would be to that extent at the mercy of foreign powers.25  The 
                                                 
19 See supra text accompanying note 17. 
20 698 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2015) (2–1 decision), cert. denied, No. 15-7017, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 2690 (Apr. 18, 
2016) (per curiam). 
21 Matthews v. Davis, 426 U.S. 67, 81 n.17 (1976). 
22 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889).  
23 U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 4 (alterations in original). 
24 Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889) (explaining that it is 
the inherent right of an independent nation to control immigration over its borders).  
25 Id. at 603. 
5 
United States has absolute power to police its borders, and to regulate aliens within its 
territories.26  
 The Supreme Court has rendered itself powerless to review Congress’s policy 
decisions that implicate immigration and naturalization.27  Decisions that directly or indirectly 
affect immigration can have detrimental effects on the Nation’s economy, national security, 
and national identity, as well as its diplomatic relationships with foreign states. 28  It can also 
affect the perceptions and expectations of aliens present in or coming to the United States, 
and perceived mistreatment of foreign-nationals present in the United States could lead to 
harmful reciprocal treatment of American citizens residing abroad.29   
Acting within its naturalization and immigration powers, Congress may lawfully 
distinguish between United States nationals 30 and aliens.31  The term “alien” includes all 
persons who are not citizens or nationals of the United States.32  The Supreme Court has 
recognized Congress’s power to categorize aliens based on their individual relationships with 
the United States.33 Congress may lawfully enact regulations that would be unconstitutional 
if applied to citizens,34 and it may grant different constitutional protections to aliens based on 
                                                 
26 Id. 
27 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 590–91 (1952) (stating that “nothing in the structure of our 
Government or the text of our Constitution would warrant judicial review by standards which would require us 
to equate our political judgment with that of Congress[,]”  and that Reform in this field must be entrusted to the 
branches of the Government in control of our international relations and treaty-making powers.”). 
28 Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012). 
29 Id. 
30 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(22), 8 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(22) (2014) (defining “national of 
the United States”).  United States nationals are further divided into citizen-nationals and non-citizen nationals.  
Non-citizen nationals owe permanent allegiance to the United States, and have the same rights as United States 
citizens.  For the purpose of this comment, I will not differentiate between citizen-nationals and non-citizen 
nationals because the distinction will not alter or affect the premise of the argument.  
31 Matthews v. Davis, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976).  
32 8 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(3). 
33 Matthews, 426 U.S. at 80 (1976) (“Congress is explicitly empowered to exercise that type of control over 
travel across the borders of the United States.”).  
34 Id. 
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their immigration statuses. 35   But, Congress must treat all individuals with the same 
immigration status equally.36   
Congress has made it unlawful for an immigrant37 to enter the United States without 
proper admission.38  The Supreme Court has stated that unlawful status is not a constitutional 
irrelevancy because entry into the class is a crime.39  Congress has granted unlawful aliens 
less constitutional protections than citizens and aliens lawfully present in the United States, 
and it has enacted regulations that more stridently regulate the whereabouts of unlawful 
aliens. 40  Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), which prohibits unlawful aliens from 
possessing firearms and/or ammunition.41  Violation of § 922(g)(5) is an aggravated felony,42 
and offenders are criminally and civilly liable, and are removable.43 
In United States v. Meza-Rodriguez,44 the Seventh Circuit split from its sister courts, 
and held that unlawful aliens are part of “the people” to whom the right to keep and bear arms 
is granted.  On November 19, 2015, the government filed a petition for writ of certiorari to 
the Supreme Court, and on April 18, 2016, the Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision, 
denied the government’s petition.45   
                                                 
35 Id. 
36 Id. Inherent in Congress’s power over immigration is its power to exclude and deport certain classes of aliens 
based on characteristics Congress deems undesirable, see  U.S. ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 291 
(1904).  
37 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (defining “immigrant”).  
38 Id. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (defining “admission”).  
39 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (5–4 decision).  See also id. at 220 n.19 (rejecting undocumented 
aliens as a suspect class, and reasoning that entry into the class is a crime, and stating that undocumente d status 
is not a constitutional irrelevancy). 
40 See id. at 218–19 (stating that undocumented aliens have been “denied benefits that our society makes 
available to citizens and lawful residents”). 
41 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(a) (2015). 
42 8 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(43)(E)(ii) (categorizing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) as an aggravated felony).  
43 Id. at § 1227(a)(2)(iii) (stating that aliens convicted of an aggravated felony are removable).  See also id. at 
§ 1229a(e)(2) (defining “removable”).   
44 698 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2015) (2–1 decision), cert. denied, No. 15-7017, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 2690 (Apr. 18, 
2016) (per curiam).   
45 Id.   
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The Seventh Circuit used an interest-balancing approach to include undocumented 
aliens in “the people” protected by the Second Amendment, even though the Heller Court 
explicitly rejected an interest-balancing approach as the appropriate method for defining the 
scope of the Second Amendment.46  Since the Supreme Court denied certiorari, undocumented 
aliens have inconsistent constitutional protections throughout the United States, and their 
rights are contingent on their whereabouts.  In the territorial jurisdiction of the Seventh 
Circuit, undocumented aliens are part of “the people,” and they have the right to keep and 
bear arms, but in the rest of the United States, undocumented aliens are not part of  “the 
people,” and are not protected by the Second Amendment. 47  The Seventh Circuit’s holding 
could have detrimental effects on immigration law and constitutional law.  The court’s 
holding situates the judiciary as the gatekeeper of undocumented aliens’ constitutional rights 
in the Seventh Circuit, and as the gatekeeper, the judiciary will eventually usurp Congress’s 
plenary power over immigration.  The Seventh Circuit’s holding and the Supreme Court’s 
decision to deny certiorari “may well be just the first of … [an] unknown number of dominos 
to be knocked off the table.”48 
                                                 
46  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 663–35 (2008) (5–4 decision) (rejecting a “judge-
empowering interest balancing inquiry”); id. at 634 (stating that “[t]he very enumeration of the right takes out 
of the hands of government—even the Third Branch of Government—the power to decide on a case-by-case 
basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon.”).  Accord McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 
787 (2010) (5–4 decision) (“In Heller, however, we expressly rejected the argument that the scope of the Second 
Amendment right should be determined by judicial interest balancing ….”).  
47  Compare United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 698 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2015) (2–1 decision) (holding 
undocumented aliens are part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment), cert. denied, No. 15-7017, 
2016 U.S. LEXIS 2690 (Apr. 18, 2016) (per curiam), with United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437 (5th 
Cir. 2011) (holding undocumented aliens are not part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment), 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 28 (2012), and United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding 
undocumented aliens are not part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment), cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 58 (2013), and United States v. Flores, 663 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (holding undocumented 
aliens are not part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 28 (2012), 
with United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2012) (reserving on whether the undocumented 
aliens are part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 289.  
48 Heller, 554 U.S. at 680 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).  
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This Comment will argue that undocumented aliens are not part of “the people” 
protected by the Second Amendment, and therefore do not have the right to keep and bear 
arms.  Part II-A will outline the history of the right to keep and bear arms.  Part II-B will 
explain the Supreme Court’s holdings in District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City 
of Chicago.  Part II-C will briefly explain the circuit split on whether undocumented aliens 
are part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment , and will analyze the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Meza-Rodriguez.  Part III is the legal analysis.  Part III-
A will argue that the Supreme Court adopted a historical approach to define the scope of the 
Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago, and 
it will explain the benefits of using a historical approach to define the scope of the Second 
Amendment.  Part III-B will interpret the scope of “the people,” and it will conclude that 
undocumented aliens are not part of “the people.”  Part III-B.1 will expound on the historical 
definition of the “the people.”  Part III-B.2 will analyze the Supreme Court’s attempts to 
define “the people” in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez and District of Columbia v. Heller, 
and will then argue that the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonald v. City of Chicago does 
not alter the scope of the Second Amendment as it applies to undocumented aliens.  Part III-
C will show that the history of the right to keep and bear arms in service to the militia, and 
the history of the common law right to keep and bear arms in self-defense excludes 
undocumented aliens from claiming a space within the protective scope of the Second 
Amendment.  Part IV is the conclusion. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The History of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms  
9 
The right to keep and bear arms is deeply rooted in history,49 and the right “has always 
been the distinctive privilege of freemen.”50  The idea that an armed populace is the best 
security for a free state derives from the philosophical texts of Ancient Greece and Ancient 
Rome. 51   The Founding Fathers relied most heavily on the seventeenth-century English 
republican ideas, which were deeply influenced by the writings of Aristotle, Cicero, and 
Niccolò Machiavelli.52  The essence of the English republican political thought was that “a 
citizenry could rule itself without the paternal guiding hand of a monarch.” 53   English 
republicans advocated for an armed populace, and promoted the idea that the power of the 
government was limited by the consent of the governed.54  The Founding Fathers, whether 
Federalist or Anti-Federalist, all agreed that an armed citizenry and liberty were inextricably 
connected.55  
1. The English Duty to Keep and Bear Arms 
Before the English Bill of Rights was ratified in 1689, it was an English subject’s duty, 
not right, to keep and to be trained in arms so that he could assist in keeping the local peace 
and defending the realm. 56   England did not have a professional police force until the 
nineteenth-century, and it did not have a standing army until the late seventeenth-century.57  
Consequently, all civil and military duties fell into the gentry.  An English subject was 
                                                 
49 STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT loc. 
312 (3rd ed. 2013) (ebook). 
50 JOHN ORDRONAUX, CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES 241 (Philadelphia, T. & J. W. 
Johnson & Co., 1891), quoted in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 619 (2008). 
51 HALBROOK, supra note 49, at loc. 345.  
52 Id. at loc. 328.  
53  David E. Vandercoy, The History of the Second Amendment, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 1007, 1020 (1994) 
(explaining seventeenth-century English political theories). 
54 HALBROOK, supra note 49, at loc. 335. 
55 Vandercoy, supra note 53, at 1022. 
56 JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 1 (photo. reprint 1996) (1994). 
57 Id. at 2.  
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expected to defend himself, his family, his property, and his neighbors from domestic and 
foreign attacks; to partake in the local peace keeping tasks, such as the “hue and cry” and the 
“watch and ward;” to partake in the sheriff’s posse comitatus;58 and to defend the country 
when called into service by the King.59   
The Crown and Parliament reserved the right to enact regulations on the possession 
and use of certain weapons, and on the possession and use of firearms by certain classes of 
people.60  The first of many game acts was enacted in 1389, and the game acts were intended 
to prevent popular insurrections by disarming certain groups of people.61  Since the beginning 
of the Glorious Reformation, Catholic subjects were suspected subversives, and regulations 
were enacted to restrict their ability keep and use weapons,62 or to completely disarm them.63  
These laws set a precedent that would permit the government to legally deprive all Catholics 
of the right to keep and bear arms in the Declaration of Rights.64 
After the English Civil War, the last Catholic King of England, James II, ascended the 
throne in 1685.65  James II sought to reinstate Roman Catholicism as the state religion. 66  
During his reign, gun control laws were enforced with greater intensity than ever before, the 
standing army was enlarged, and the militia was completely eliminated through disuse.67  
James II appointed Catholics to positions at the head of the army,68 and ordered all non-
                                                 
58 Id. at 2–3.  
59 Id. at 4.  The King was the commander-in-chief of the citizen-militia.  
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 12.  
62  Id. All Catholics were prohibited from possessing weapons related to militia service, however it was 
presumed that they kept weapons in their homes for self-defense.   
63 Vandercoy, supra note 53, at 1015. 
64 MALCOLM, supra note 56, at 12. 
65 Id. at 96. 
66 Id. 
67 David. B. Kopel, Courts and Constitution: It Isn’t About Duck Hunting , 93 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1346–47 
(1995) (reviewing JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS (1994)).  
68 Vandercoy, supra note 53, at 1017. 
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government personnel to be disarmed.69  The British-Anglicans, led by William of Orange, 
resisted James II’s efforts to catholicize the state, and William of Orange defeated James II 
in 1688 at the conclusion of the Glorious Revolution.70 
2. The English Right to Keep and Bear Arms  
In 1689, William III and Mary II signed the Declaration of Rights (enacted by 
Parliament as the English Bill of Rights) as a condition to their appointments as King Queen.71  
The Declaration narrated James II’s abuses, limited the Crown’s powers, and enumerated the 
rights of the subjects.72  The English Bill of Rights ensured that history would never repeat 
itself. 73   
The English Bill of Rights prohibited the Crown from establishing and/or maintaining 
a standing army without the consent of Parliament.74  It also granted the Protestant subjects 
the right to keep and bear arms as suitable to their conditions, and as allowed by law.75  The 
Declaration of Rights only limited the powers of the Crown—it did not limit the powers of 
Parliament. 76   Parliament could lawfully restrict the use of firearms by Protestants, but 
Parliament could not eliminate their right to keep firearms because possession was protected 
as a right.77  But, the Catholics were barred from claiming the right to keep and bear arms 
because the Declaration neglected to grant them the right. 78   Although Catholics were 
                                                 
69 Kopel, supra note 67, at 1347. 
70 Id. at 1348. 
71 Vandercoy, supra note 53, at 1017. 
72 Id.  
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 1018–19 
75 Id.  
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 MALCOLM, supra note 56, at 123. 
12 
permitted to keep weapons in their homes for self-defense, contemporaneous legislation 
imposed severe restrictions on their ability to keep and use firearms.79   
Parliament intended to grant Protestants an individual right to use arms in self-defense 
and a political right to keep and bear arms in service to the militia.80  The political right was 
thought to be the more important of the two rights.81  It was believed that the individual right 
to keep and bear arms presupposed the political right, and without the individual right, the 
political right was useless.82  The English right to keep and bear arms would be the predecessor 
to the Second Amendment to the American Constitution.83  
3. The American Right to Keep and Bear Arms  
The colonists arriving in the seventeenth century were “men and women steeped in 
English laws, English customs, English prejudices, and English habits of mind.”84   The 
American colonists implemented the entire body of the English common law in the New 
World, and the colonists inherited “all the rights of natural subjects, as if born and abiding in 
England[,]”85 including the right to keep and bear arms.  English history, common law and 
political ideologies dominated American culture, and continued to do so even after the 
colonies declared independence.86   
                                                 
79 Vandercoy, supra note 53, at 1019. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 MALCOLM, supra note 56, at 164. 
84 Id. at 137. 
85 Id. at 138 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).  See also MALCOLM, supra note 56, at 134 
(“The right of individuals to be armed had becomes as the [English] Bill of Rights had claimed it was, an 
ancient and indubitable right.  It was this heritage the Englishmen took with them to the American colonies and 
this heritage which Americans fought to protect in 1775.”).  
86 Id. at 138.   
13 
The Founding Fathers knew that “[n]othing [was] more certain than the indispensable 
necessity of government …. ”87  But, the Founders feared that a central government might 
become oppressive, and disarm the people, thereby taking away the people’s only defense 
against an oppressive government.  The Founding Fathers all agreed that “dependence on the 
people, is no doubt, the primary control on the government …[,]”88 and that a citizen-militia 
was the “only substitute that can be devised for a standing army, and [it was the] best possible 
security against it …. ”89  It was understood across the American political spectrum that if the 
newly established constitutional order broke down, then the citizen-militia would disarm the 
federal military forces and re-establish order.90  To preserve the citizen-militia, the Founders 
ratified the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The Second Amendment 
states, “A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of 
the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”91   
The Founders knew that the citizen-militia needed to be composed of the “right sort of 
men and [that it must be] used sensibly[,]”92 so that it would not transform into a select-militia 
or a standing army.93  The Founders divided the control over the citizen-militia between the 
federal government and the State governments.  Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 empowers 
Congress,  
To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such 
Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the 
States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the 
Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress to the States94   
                                                 
87 THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 8 (John Jay) (Project Gutenberg EText ed., n.d.) (alterations in original).  
88 Id. 
89 MALCOLM, supra note 56, at 180 (alteration in original). 
90 Id. at 162. 
91 CONST. II, amend. II. 
92 MALCOLM, supra note 56, at 142 (alterations in original). 
93 Patrick Charles, Second Amendment and Individual Militia Rights, 9 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 323, 367 (2011) 
[hereinafter Militia Rights] (describing the difference between a well regulated militia and a select militia).  
94 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
14 
 
The states were expected to maintain and train the citizen-militia.95  The states enacted militia 
laws that defined the obligations and qualifications for service.96  The militia laws excused 
and/or excluded certain individuals and classes of people from service.97  The militia was 
compromised of “all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense.”98  
When the citizen-militia was called into service, the militiamen were expected to bring their 
personal arms, and to join together for the common defense.99  The militiamen were “civilians 
primarily, soldiers on occasion.”100  
B. The Supreme Court Interprets the Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller 
and McDonald v. City of Chicago  
 
a. District of Columbia v. Heller 
Special Police Office Dick Heller challenged three District of Columbia laws that 
prohibited and criminalized the possession and registration of handguns kept in the home for 
self-defense.101  The Supreme Court addressed whether the District’s prohibition on handguns 
violated Special Police Officer Heller’s Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.102  
In a 5–4 decision,103 the Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right 
                                                 
95 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939). 
96 Id.  
97 Id.   
98 Id. at 179. 
99 Id.  It was believed that a citizen-militia was an adequate defense against domestic and foreign attacks, and 
that trained soldiers would only be needed on occasion.  
100 Id. at 179. 
101 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 554, 574–76 (2008) (5–4 decision) (explaining the laws challenged 
by Officer Heller).  Special Police Officer Heller challenged three firearm regulations.  Although there were 
minor exceptions to the laws, the laws in effect completely prohibit firearm possession in the home.  The 
exceptions are not pertinent to the issue before the Court. 
102 Id. at 573. 
103 Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, Justice 
Thomas and Justice Alito joined.  Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, in wh ich Justice Souter, Justice 
Ginsberg, and Justice Breyer joined.  Justice Breyer also filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Stevens, 
Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg joined.  I will briefly mention the dissenting opinions, but the dissents’ 
interpretations of the Second Amendment are not pertinent to the argument.   
15 
to keep and bear arms that are not related to service in the militia, and it stated that the Second 
Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for traditionally lawful purposes.104  
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, identified the core right protected by the Second 
Amendment to be an individual right to keep and use a handgun in the home for self-
defense.105  The Court was careful to note that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear 
arms is not unlimited.106  
The Second Amendment naturally divides into two parts—the prefatory clause and the 
operative clause. 107  The prefatory clause states, “A well regulated militia, being necessary 
to the security of a free state …. ”108  The operative clause states, “the right of the people to 
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”109  The Court concluded that the prefatory clause 
does not limit the operative clause, and that the prefatory clause merely explains why the right 
to keep and bear arms was codified in the Bill of Rights.110  The operative clause protects an 
individual’s private right to keep a handgun in the home for self-defense, and an individual’s 
ability to exercise his Second Amendment right is not limited to, or contingent upon, service 
in the militia.111   
The Court identified “the people” protected by the Second Amendment to be the 
individual members of the political community.112  Justice Scalia113 quoted the definition of 
                                                 
104 Heller, 554 U.S. at 636. 
105 Id.  
106 Id. at 595. 
107 Id. at 577. 
108 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
109 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
110 Heller, 554 U.S. at 595–600. 
111 Id.  
112 Id. at 580. 
113 Justice Scalia joined the majority in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), which held 
that the Fourth Amendment does not protect non-citizen, foreign nationals against warrantless searches outside 
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 
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“the people” devised by Chief Justice Rehnquist in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.114  In 
Verdugo-Urquidez, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated,  
“[T]he people” … seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the 
Constitution .... While this textual exegesis is by no means conclusive, it suggests  that 
“the people” protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second 
Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who 
have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part 
of that community115 
 
Although Justice Scalia quoted the Verdugo-Urquidez definition of “the people,” he tapered 
the scope of “the people” from encompassing the national community to only the political 
community.116  Justice Scalia continued his analysis under the presumption “that the Second 
Amendment right [can be] exercised individually[,] and [it] belongs to all Americans.”117   
Justice Scalia stated that the Second Amendment, like all constitutional rights, is 
enshrined with the scope it was understood to have at the time of its ratification. 118  Justice 
Scalia examined the history and meaning of the right to keep and bear arms before and after 
the Second Amendment was ratified, and concluded that the Second Amendment protects the 
right to keep and bear arms for military and civilian purposes.119  The Court stated that the 
Second Amendment protects the American common law right to keep and bear arms in self-
defense, which the American colonists originally inherited as from the English common law 
as English subjects.120  The Court concluded that “the very text of the Second Amendment 
                                                 
114 Heller, 554 U.S. at 580 (quoting the Verdugo-Urquidez definition of “the people”). 
115  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (6–3 decision) (alteration in original) 
(emphasis added), quoted in Heller, 554 U.S. at 581. 
116 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 580–81 (analyzing the term “the people” in the Bill of Rights).  
117 Id. (alterations in original). 
118 Id. at 634. 
119 See generally id. at 592–95 (tracing the history of the right to keep and bear arms from the English duty to 
keep and bear arms to the right to keep and bear arms as it is today).  
120 Id. at 592–95. 
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implicitly recognized the pre-existence of the right and declared only that it shall not be 
infringed …. [T]his is not a right granted by the Constitution.”121   
In dissent, Justice Breyer argued that the history of the right to keep and bear arms is 
the beginning, not the end, of the constitutional inquiry.122  Justice Breyer explained that an 
individual’s ability to keep a loaded handgun in the home for self-defense is a “subsidiary 
interest[] that the Second Amendment seeks to serve.” 123   Justice Scalia refuted Justice 
Breyer’s claim, and stated that “self-defense had little do to with the right’s codification; it 
was the central component of the right itself.”124  
The Heller Court emphasized that, “[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the Second 
Amendment is not unlimited.”125  The Second Amendment “surely elevates above all other 
interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and 
home.”126  Justice Scalia emphasized that “nothing in [the Court’s] opinion should be taken 
to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the 
mentally ill, … or [on] laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale 
of firearms.”127  The majority stated that the long-standing prohibitions on the right to keep 
and bear arms are constitutional, and that the aforementioned list is merely exemplary, not 
exhaustive. 128  The Court failed to explain why the prohibitions are constitutional.  Justice 
Scalia also noted that precedent does not foreclose the Heller Court’s interpretation of the 
                                                 
121 Id. at 592 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting United State s v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 568, 553 
(1875) (internal quotations omitted)). 
122 Id. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
123 Id. at 714 (alteration in original) (arguing that Justice Story did not believe the Second Amendment conferred 
an individual right of self defense to the people).   
124 Id. at 599 (majority opinion). 
125 Id. at 626. 
126 Id. at 635 (emphasis added). 
127 Id. at 627–28 (alterations in original). 
128 Id. at 626 n.26. 
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Second Amendment.129  The Court even stated that its precedent supports its holding because 
the Court has only ever upheld limitations on the scope of the Second Amendment that have 
been based in the historical understanding of the right to keep and bear arms.130   
The Supreme Court did not identify the applicable standard of review for Second 
Amendment challenges.  In dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the majority’s failure to 
establish a standard of review, and he proposed that an interest-balancing inquiry should be 
applied to Second Amendment challenges. 131   Justice Stevens argued that an interest-
balancing approach would better address the concerns relating to firearms, and he stated that 
“the majority’s decision threatens severely to limit the ability of more knowledgeable, 
democratically elected officials to deal with gun-related problems.”132  But, the majority 
rejected Justice Stevens’ interest-balancing approach, explaining that it is too “judge 
empowering.”133  Justice Scalia also noted that rational basis review is not the appropriate 
level of scrutiny to apply to Second Amendment challenges.134   
The Supreme Court stated that modern technological developments do not alter the 
scope of an enumerated constitutional rights,135 and the Second Amendment extends prima 
facie to all modern technological developments that fall within the historical understanding 
of the right to keep and bear arms.136  Justice Scalia explained that “[c]onstitutional rights are 
                                                 
129 Id. at 625. 
130 Id. at 627. 
131 Id. at 690 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
132 Id. at 719. 
133 Id. at 633 (majority opinion). 
134 Id. at 628 n.27 (“If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, 
the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, 
and would have no effect.”). 
135 Id. at 628–29.  See also id. at 627–28 (“[T]he fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit 
between the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change [the Court’s] interpretation of the right.”).  
136 Id. at 582.  
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enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them ….  ”137  
The Court did “not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis of the full scope of the Second 
Amendment,”138 and the Supreme Court left it to future cases to “expound on the historical 
justifications for the exceptions [to the Second Amendment] when those exceptions come 
before [it].”139  
b. McDonald v. City of Chicago 
In McDonald v. City of Chicago,140 the Supreme Court, in a splintered 5–4 decision,141 
incorporated the Second Amendment right that was recognized in Heller against the States.142  
Four citizens challenged Chicago’s gun laws that prohibited residents from keeping a handgun 
in the home for self-defense.143  Justice Alito, writing for the plurality, incorporated the 
Second Amendment against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.144  Justice Thomas, the majority’s critical fifth vote, concurred in the judgment, 
but incorporated the Second Amendment through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 145   The plurality and Justice Thomas reached their respective 
                                                 
137 Id. at 634 (alteration in original). 
138 Id. at 635. 
139 Id. (alterations in original). 
140 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (5–4 decision). 
141 Justice Alito delivered the judgment and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II -A, and III, in 
which Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas joined.  Justice Alito, joined 
by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy, concluded in Parts II -C, IV, and V, that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller 
against the States.  Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion.  Justice Thomas filed a separate opinion, 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.  Justice Thomas concluded that the Privileges or Immun ities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller against 
the States.  Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion.  Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice 
Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor joined. 
142 McDonald, 561 U.S. (majority opinion).  See id. at 791 (plurality opinion) (“In Heller, we held that the 
Second Amendment protects the right to possess a handgun in the home for the purpose of self -defense.”).  See 
also id. at 767–68 (stating that the Heller Court “concluded, citizens must permitted to use handguns for the 
core lawful purpose of self-defense”). 
143 Id. at 750. 
144 Id. at 778 (plurality opinion) (reasoning that the Second Amendment is “fundamental right necessary to the 
our system of ordered liberty …[and] deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition ….”).  
145 Id. at 806 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
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conclusions by analyzing the history of the right to keep and bear arms.146  The McDonald 
majority affirmed that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is not unlimited.147  
C. The Circuit Court Split on the Scope of the Second Amendment  
After the Supreme Court’s rulings in Heller and McDonald, a considerable effort has 
been made to expand the scope of the Second Amendment to include undocumented aliens 
among “the people” entitled to the right to keep and bear arms.148  But, the lower courts have 
resisted expanding the scope of “the people,” until recently.  The Fifth,149 Fourth,150 and 
Eighth151 Circuits have held that undocumented aliens are not part of “the people” protected 
by the Second Amendment, and the Tenth Circuit reserved on ruling whether undocumented 
aliens are part of “the people.” 152  Each of the courts’ respective decisions has been appealed 
to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court has denied each petition for writ of certiorari.153   
 
1. United States v. Meza-Rodriguez 
In United States v. Meza-Rodriguez,154 the Seventh Circuit, in a 2–1 decision, split 
from the Fifth, Fourth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits.  Chief Judge Wood, writing for the 
                                                 
146  See generally id. (majority opinion); id. (Thomas, J., concurring opinion) (incorporating the Second 
Amendment through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); id. (Alito, J., plurality 
opinion) (incorporating the Second Amendment through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
147 Id. at 927 (majority opinion) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2010) (warning 
that the right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense is not unlimited)). 
148 See supra text accompanying note 17. 
149 United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011) (2–3 decision). 
150 United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974 (4th Cir. 2012). 
151 United States v. Flores, 663 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).  
152 United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 289. 
153 See United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 28 (2012); United 
States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 58 (2013); United States v. Flores, 
663 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 28 (2012); United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 
1164 (10th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 289. 
154 698 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2015) (2–1 decision), cert. denied, No. 15-7017, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 2690 (Apr. 18, 
2016) (per curiam).   
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majority, held that undocumented aliens are part of “the people” protected by the Second 
Amendment.155  
Just before midnight on August 13, 2013, Milwaukee police officers responded to a 
report that there was an armed man at a local bar.  The responding officers were not able to 
apprehend the man, but they did identify him as Defendant-Appellant, Mariano Meza-
Rodriguez,156 who is a citizen of Mexico157 unlawfully present in the United States,158 and who 
is a repeat criminal offender.159  A few hours later, the officers responded to a second report 
of a fight at a neighboring bar.160  The officers identified the aggressor at the neighboring bar 
as Defendant-Appellant. 161   After a foot chase, the police officers seized Defendant-
Appellant, and found a .22 caliber cartridge on his person.162  Meza-Rodriguez was charged 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), 163  which makes it an aggravated felony for an 
undocumented alien to be in possession of a firearm and/or ammunition.164  The Defendant-
Appellant plead guilty,165 and he filed a timey notice of appeal from his conviction, and he 
preserved for appeal the issue of whether § 922(g)(5) unconstitutionally burdens his Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms.166  
                                                 
155 Id. at 672.  The Seventh Circuit also held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(a) is constitutional under the Second 
Amendment, see id. at 673.  
156 Id. at 666. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 667.  See also United States v. Meza, No. 13–CR–192, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50485, at *17, n.3 (E.D. 
Wis. Feb. 25, 2014) (“Meza’s criminal history also includes several arrests for offenses ranging from criminal 
damage to property to theft to robbery with use of force, although no dispositions are reported.”).  
160 Id. at 666. 
161 Id.  The Defendant-Appellant was brought to the United States when he was four or five years old, and he 
has remained in the United States since, but he has never regularized his status.   
162 Id.  
163 Id. 
164 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(a). 
165 Meza-Rodriguez, 698 F.3d at 667.   
166 Id. The United States District Court for the Easter District of Wisconsin sentenced Defendant-Appellant to 
time served with no supervised release.  After Defendant-Appellant served his sentenced, he was removed to 
Mexico.  The Defendant-Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from his conviction.  The court ruled that 
Defendant-Appellant’s removal to Mexico did not render his appeal moot, id. at 667–69. 
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The Seventh Circuit first addressed whether the Second Amendment protects unlawful 
immigrants.167  The court held that unlawful immigrants are part of “the people” protected by 
the Second Amendment. 168   Next, the court addressed whether § 922(g)(5) burdens an 
undocumented alien’s right to keep and bear arms.169  The court applied intermediate scrutiny, 
and held that § 922(g)(5) does not impermissibly restrict an undocumented alien’s right to 
keep and bear arms.170 
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the Heller Court frequently links the “Second 
Amendment rights with the notions of ‘law-abiding citizens’ and ‘members of the political 
community.’”171  But, the Seventh Circuit stated that it was reluctant to place weight on the 
language in Heller that links the Second Amendment right to law-abiding citizens and 
members of the political community because the issue of whether aliens are protected by the 
Second Amendment was not the issue before the Supreme Court in Heller.172  Instead, the 
Seventh Circuit determined that the Verdugo-Urquidez definition of “the people” 173  was 
controlling. 174   The court reasoned that the Heller Court affirmed the Verdugo-Urquidez 
Court’s assertion that the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments protect to the same group 
of people,175 and the court noted that interpreting the Second Amendment under the Verdugo-
Urquidez definition of “the people” is consistent with idea that “the people” has the same 
                                                 
167 Id. at 669. 
168 Id. at 672. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 673.  I will not discuss the second issue in great depth because the comment addresses whether 
undocumented aliens are within the scope of the Second Amendment, not whether the 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) is 
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171 Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)). 
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meaning throughout the Bill of Rights.176  The Seventh Circuit also relied177 on Plyler v. Doe, 
which held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects all persons 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.178  The court concluded that “[i]n the 
post-Heller world, … it is now clear that the Second Amendment right to bear arms is no 
second-class entitlement, [and the court saw] no principled way to carve out the Second 
Amendment and say that unauthorized [aliens] … are excluded”179 from its protections.  
The Seventh Circuit then subjected the Second Amendment to a case-by-case analysis, 
and it found that Meza-Rodriguez is protected by the Second Amendment because he is a 
member of the national community.180  The court first noted that because Defendant-Appellant 
is physically present in the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, he is protected by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore entitled to some 
constitutional protections.181  The court then decided that Defendant-Appellant is a member 
of the national community because he has developed “sufficient connections” to the United 
States because had continuously resided in the United States for over twenty years before he 
was removed to Mexico; he had developed close relationships with family members and 
acquaintances who lived in the United States; he had attended public school in Milwaukee; 
and he had sporadically worked while he was present in the United States.182  The court stated 
that it “does not dispute that [Defendant-Appellant] has fallen down on the job of performing 
                                                 
176 Id.  
177 Id. at 671–72 (construing Plyler v. Doe, 557 U.S. 202 (1891), to “show[] that even unauthorized aliens enjoy 
certain constitutional rights, and so unauthorized status (reflected in the lack of documentations) cannot support 
a per se exclusion from the people protected by the Bill of Rights”).  
178 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1981). 
179 Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d. at 672. 
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as a responsible member of the community.” 183   Nonetheless, it ruled that Defendant-
Appellant is a member of the national community, in spite of his “unsavory traits, [which] 
includ[es] multiple breaches with the law, failure to file tax returns, and lack of a steady job[] 
…. ”184  The Seventh Circuit subjected the Second Amendment to a case-by-case analysis, and 
it empowered the judiciary to use its discretion to decide whether or not to grant 
undocumented aliens the right to keep and bear arms.185  
The court then applied a level of scrutiny akin to intermediate scrutiny to the 
Defendant-Appellant’s Second Amendment challenge.186  The court held that § 922(g)(5) is 
constitutional under the Second Amendment. 187   The court reasoned that Congress has 
determined that undocumented aliens are presumptively risky individuals, and it concluded 
that preventing undocumented aliens from possessing firearms and ammunition substantially 
relates to the government’s important interest in protecting the public against armed 
violence.188   
Judge Flaum concurred in the majority’s ruling that § 922(g)(5) is constitutional under 
the Second Amendment, but doubted whether the scope of the Second Amendment is so 
expansive as to include undocumented aliens. 189   Judge Flaum critiqued the majority’s 
reliance on the Verdugo-Urquidez definition of “the people.”190  He stated that the Verdugo-
Urquidez definition of “the people” is “unsettled,” and that “Heller provides considerable 
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184 Id. (alterations in original). 
185 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has appellate jurisdiction over the courts in the 
following districts: Central District of Illinois, Northern District of Illinois, Southern District of Illino is, 
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reason to doubt that an undocumented immigrant can enjoy Second Amendment rights at 
all.”191  Judge Flaum stated that the court should have followed the Tenth Circuit, and reserve 
on the constitutional question of whether undocumented aliens are part of “the people.”192  
On November 19, 2015, the government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court, and on April 18, 2016, the Supreme Court denied the government’s 
petition.193 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. Shaping the Future with the Past: The Benefits of Using a Historical Approach to Define 
the Scope of the Second Amendment  
 
The Constitution’s endurance rests in its immutability, and its immutability is what 
protects the people’s right to define the national identity through the political process.194 
When the judiciary rules on policy issues that concern constitutional rights, the decisions are 
final, and the judiciary has usurped the power of the people to define society through the 
political process, and “the people will have ceased, to be their own rulers, having, to that extent, 
practically resigned their government, into the hands of that eminent tribunal.”195  To avoid a 
future where the people are at the mercy of the judiciary, the Constitution must be interpreted 
in its original meaning so that the people’s right to define the national identity is preserved.  
                                                 
191 Id.  
192 Id. 
193 United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 698 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2015) (2–1 decision), cert. denied, No. 15-7017, 
2016 U.S. LEXIS 2690 (Apr. 18, 2016) (per curiam).  
194  Justice Antonin Scalia, Judicial Adherence to the Text of Our Basic Law: A Theory of Constitution 
Interpretation, Speech at Catholic University of America (Oct. 18 1996) [hereinafter Judicial Adherence]. 
195  Pres. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861 available at 
http://www.ushistory.org/documents/lincoln1.htm (“At the same time the candid citizen must confess that if the 
policy of the Government upon the vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by the 
decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation between parties in personal 
actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their 
Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.”).  
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In District of Columbia v. Heller,196 the late Justice Scalia, who is regarded as “the 
most influential justice of the century” by his fellow Justices,197 preserved the scope of the 
Second Amendment in the history of the right to keep and bear arms.  Nevertheless, some 
historians have questioned and critiqued the Supreme Court’s historical accounts of the right 
to keep and bear arms in Heller and McDonald.198  But, it must be noted that historians and 
judiciaries have conflicting motivations for studying history—historians seek to reveal the 
truth, whereas judiciaries seek to establish a workable jurisprudence based on definitive 
answers.199  Historians look to the past and marvel at the ironies, while judiciaries look to the 
past to shape the future. 200   Justice Scalia stated that “the question is not whether [a] 
historically focused method is a perfect means of restraining aristocratic judicial Constitution 
writing; but whether it is the best means available in an imperfect world.”201  
The text and history of the Second Amendment will resolve whether unlawful aliens 
are entitled to the Second Amendment right.  Defining the scope of the Second Amendment 
in the history of the right to keep and bear arms will shield the Second Amendment from 
“vague ethico-political First Principles [sic] whose combined conclusion can be found to point 
in any direction [a] judge [may] favor[].”202  
B. Undocumented Aliens are Not “The People”  
1. The History of “The People”  
                                                 
196 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2010). 
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 “The people” is a term of art used in select parts of the Constitution.203  The Preamble 
declares that “the people” ordained and established the Constitution “in order to form a more 
perfect union.” 204   “The people” in the Preamble are the same people who declared 
independence from Great Britain, and signed the Declaration of Independence in 1776.   
The Declaration of Independence was rooted in two principals—human equality and 
consent of the governed.205  According to the principal of equality, all men are created equal, 
and all men possess unalienable, natural rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.206  
But, natural rights not secure in the natural state of being, and to preserve these rights, 
government are established among men, and these government act as the keeper of its people’s 
natural rights.207  The government only protects the natural rights of its citizens, who are the 
people who submit to its power, take on civil obligations in return for protection, and who 
swear allegiance to it.208  The government only owes its citizens its complete loyalty and 
protection.209  
Although the 1787 Constitution did not formally define citizenship, 210 it did empower 
Congress “[t]o establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization …  throughout the United States …. 
”211  During the Founding, the goal of naturalization and immigration was to increase the 
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wealth and strength of the United States.212  Immigrants were welcomed, and even encouraged, 
to settle in the United States.213  But, the Founders were concerned that an open immigration 
policy would severely encroach on the development of the United States’ national identity, 
and so it limited naturalization citizenship to persons who would “throw their fortunes into a 
common lot with ours.”214  The Naturalization Act of 1790 the first law to define citizenship, 
and restrict access to naturalization citizenship.215  The Act of 1790 required, amongst other 
things, that a naturalizing alien swear an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the United 
States.216  A naturalizing alien was also required to appreciate and understand the principals 
of self-governance.217  Naturalized citizens were granted all the constitutional rights and 
protections that were afforded to natural born citizens.   
“The Constitution’s protections against governmental abrogation of rights were 
reserved for the citizenry; they did not extend to aliens.”218  The Federalist and Republican 
debates illustrate the dispute as to whether non-citizens were entitled to constitutional rights.  
The Federalists wanted to limit the constitutional protections afforded to non-citizens, and 
they argued that only citizens were entitled to constitutional rights because only citizens 
submitted to the power of the government.219  The Jeffersonian-Republicans argued that the 
Constitution protected all persons who observed the laws of the land.220  Eventually, the 
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an oath of true faith and allegiance to the United States and to the Constitution, and that only the citizens were 
entitled to the full protections of the Constitution).  
219 Id. at 34. 
220 Id.  
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Federalist’s prevailed.  In the late eighteenth-century, the Federalists dominated the 5th 
Congress, and it passed the Alien and Seditions Acts, which allowed Congress and the 
Executive to stringently regulate immigration and naturalization, and to curtail the 
constitutional protections afforded to aliens.221  
The modern idea of American Citizenship did not develop until the Reconstruction, 
when the 39th Congress ratified the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States.222  The Fourteenth Amendment223 overruled Dred Scott v. Sandford,224 which held that 
African Americans were not citizens, and codified the Civil Rights Act of 1866.225  The Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 defined citizenship to include “all persons born in the United Sta tes and 
not subject to any foreign power … [and declared that] such citizens, of every race and color 
… shall have the same right[s] …. ”  The Fourteenth Amendment required all citizens, and persons 
similarly situated, to be treated equally.226  The Reconstruction Congress did not intend for, nor did 
the public believe that, the Fourteenth Amendment required all persons of all legal statuses to be 
                                                 
221 Geoffrey Heeren, Persons Who are Not the People: The Changing Rights of Immigrants in the United States, 
44 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 367, 377 (2013) (explaining the history of immigrants’ rights in the United 
States). 
222 Janel Thamkul, The Plenary Power-Shaped Hole in the Core Constitutional Law Curriculum: Exclusion, 
Unequal Protection, and American National Identity, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 553, 557 (2008) (explaining how 
citizenship shapes the national identity).  
223 CORNELL, supra note 199, at loc. 2532 
The problem [Republican Senator John Bingham of Ohio, who drafted the Amendment,] and 
abolitionists of a legalistic cast of mind encountered was that the original understanding of federalism 
placed state violations of individual rights in the purview of sta te constitutional law, not federal law. 
In practice this meant blacks and abolitionists had no real remedy in southern courts or legislatures 
prior to the Civil War. The structure of federalism had created a refuge for opponents of liberty and 
equality. Even if one believed that state violations of the federal Bill of Rights were unconstitutional, 
the Constitution provided no basis for appeals to the federal courts, and Congress lacked any direct 
authority to alleviate these injustices. Indeed, Bingham had argued that the abolitionist-inspired Civil 
Rights Act enacted by Congress was unconstitutional precisely because the Constitution had not 
bestowed this type of sweeping authority on Congress or the courts. The Fourteenth Amendment solved 
this problem by giving Congress the legal mandate to deal with state deprivations of basic rights.  
224 60 U.S. 393 (1858). 
225 See supra text accompanying note 223. 
226 See supra text accompanying note 223. 
30 
treated equally. 227   In NOTES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, William A. 
Sutherland summarized the prevailing view of the legal commentators during the 
Reconstruction, which was that “the Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to interfere in the 
least with the exercise of [the police] power that the states …[,]”228 and it was not designed to 
tamper with the original scopes of the enumerated constitutional rights.229  
2. Sometimes They’re In; Sometimes They’re Out: Excluding Undocumented Immigrants from 
the “The People”  
 
a. The First Attempt to Define “The People:” The Verdugo-Urquidez Definition of “The 
People” 
 
Before District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court had only attempted to define 
“the people” once before in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.230  The Verdugo-Urquidez 
Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the search of a residence located in 
Mexico, and owned by a Mexican national who had no voluntary connections to the United 
States.231  In its analysis of the scope of the Fourth Amendment, the Court proposed that  
“The people” protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second 
Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who 
have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part 
of that community232   
 
                                                 
227 See e.g., THE LOYAL GEORGIAN, Feb. 3, 1866, at 3, col. 4 (“We answer certainly you have the same right to 
own and carry arms that other citizens have. You are not only free but citizens of the United States and as such 
entitled to the same privileges granted to other citizens by the constitution .…”); The Arms Seizure, NEW 
ORLEANS PICAYUNE, Sept. 10, 1874, at 1, col. 4 (“The right of an American citizen to possess and bear arms is 
guaranteed to him by the constitution. The right of a merchant to sell and of an individual to buy arms, is 
beyond all question.”). 
228 WILLIAM A. SUTHERLAND, NOTES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 698 (1904).  See also, 
CORNELL, supra note 199, at loc. 3055 (explaining that legal commentators during the Reconstruction did not 
believe that the Fourteenth Amendment altered the scope of the Second Amendment).  
229 CORNELL, supra note 199, at loc. 3105. 
230 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
231 Id. at 274–75. 
232 Id. at 265. 
31 
But, as Justice Brennan noted in dissent, the Court left the “precise contours of its sufficient 
connections test unclear[,]” 233  and the Court did not clearly define what constitutes a 
“substantial connection.”  It merely suggested that voluntary presence in the United States 
and/or acceptance of some societal obligations might constitute a “substantial connection.”234  
But, the Court “tempered [its] seemingly alien-friendly approach with the caveat that 
constitutional [rights] apply differently to citizens and aliens.” 235   
The Verdugo-Urquidez Court also endorsed a uniform reading of “the people” 
throughout the Constitution, however a uniform reading of “the people” in the First, Second, 
and Fourth Amendments does not necessarily warrant including undocumented aliens in the 
definition of “the people.”  The Verdugo-Urquidez holding is often wrongly cited as granting 
undocumented aliens Fourth Amendment rights, even though the Verdugo-Urquidez Court 
explicitly stated that it has never ruled on whether undocumented aliens are protected by the 
Fourth Amendment. 236   The Court inferred that the Fourth Amendment does not protect 
undocumented aliens present in the United States.237   
                                                 
233 Id. 244 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
234 See generally id. (majority opinion).  See also id. at 232 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court admits that 
the people extends beyond the citizenry, but leaves the precise contours of its sufficient connection test 
unclear.”). 
235 Olesya A. Salnikova, Comment, “The People” of Heller and their Politics: Whether Illegal Aliens Should 
have the Right to Bear Arms After United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 625, 649 
(2013) (explaining the Supreme Court’s holding in Verdugo-Urquidez). 
236 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 272.   
The Court of Appeals found some support for its holding in our decision in INS v. Lopez–Mendoza, 
468 U.S. 1032, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984), where a majority of Justices assumed that the 
Fourth Amendment applied to illegal aliens in the United States.  We cannot fault the Court of Appeals 
for placing some reliance on the case, but our decision did not expressly address the proposition 
gleaned by the court below. The question presented for decision in Lopez–Mendoza was limited to 
whether the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule should be extended to civil deportation 
proceedings; it did not encompass whether the protections of the Fourth Amendment extend to illegal 
aliens in this country. The Court often grants certiorari to decide part icular legal issues while assuming 
without deciding the validity of antecedent propositions ….  Our statements in Lopez-Mendoza are 
therefore not dispositive of how the Court would rule on a Fourth Amendment claim by illegal aliens 
in the United States if such a claim was squarely before us. 
237 Id. at 283 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).   
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Undocumented aliens rights under the First Amendment are just as tenuous as their 
rights under the Fourth Amendment.  Although the Supreme Court has recognized that 
“freedom of speech and press is accorded to aliens residing in this country[,]” 238 and that “the 
assurance of First Amendment rights is everyone’s concern[,]” 239  the Court has recently 
restricted undocumented aliens’ First Amendment rights.  In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that undocumented 
aliens are entitled to raise selective enforcement defenses under the First Amendment during 
removal proceedings.240   The Court reasoned that “when an alien’s continuing presence in 
this country is in violation of the immigration laws, the Government does not offend the 
Constitution by deporting him for the additional reason that it believes him to be a member 
of an organization that supports terrorist activity.” 241  By depriving undocumented aliens the 
constitutional defense, the Court restricted undocumented aliens’ rights under the First 
Amendment, and inferred that unlawful aliens do not enjoy the full protections of the First 
Amendment. 242   The First and Fourth Amendment jurisprudences do not mandate that 
undocumented aliens be included in the definition of “the people,” and it would not be 
inconsistent with precedent to exclude them from “the people.”  It may even be more 
consistent with precedent to exclude undocumented aliens from “the people.” 
b. A Slight of Hand: Narrowing the Scope of “The People” to Exclude Undocumented Aliens  
 
The Heller Court relied on the Verdugo-Urquidez definition of “the people,” but in a 
slight of hand, Justice Scalia restricted the scope of “the people” to include only members of 
                                                 
238 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (alteration in original).  
239 Salnikova, supra note 235, at 649 (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 282 (1945)).  
240 Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471 (1999). 
241 Id. at 491–92. 
242 Salnikova, supra note 235, at 650 (quoting Maryam Kamali Miyamoto, The First Amendment After Reno v. 
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the political community.243  The Heller definition is controlling because the legitimacy of the 
Verdugo-Urquidez definition of “the people” is questionable, and Heller provides 
considerable reason to doubt the validity of the Verdugo-Urquidez definition of “the people.”   
In Verdugo-Urquidez, four justices adopted the substantial connections test, and five 
justices out rightly rejected it.244  Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, 
and Justice Kennedy joined the majority but filed a concurring opinion that rejected Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s interpretation of the scope of the Fourth Amendment.   Justice Stevens 
rejected the substantial connections test,245 and stated that Court’s opinion was overly broad, 
and that it was not sensible since the issue before the Court was quite narrow. 246   In 
concurrence, Justice Kennedy doubted the Court’s definition of “the people.” 247   Justice 
Kennedy explained that he “cannot place any weight on the reference to the people in the 
Fourth Amendment as a source of restricting its protections …. ” 248   The substantial 
connections test survived by only four Justices, and its legality is questionable.249 
In Heller, Justice Scalia defined “the people” to include only the members of the 
political community.250  In United States v. Cruikshank,251 Chief Justice Waite explained that 
Citizens are the members of the political community to which they belong. They are 
the people who compose the community, and who, in their associated capacity, have 
established or submitted themselves to the domain of the government, the people may 
confer upon it such powers as they choose. 
 
                                                 
243 Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second Amendment: Citizenship and the Right to Bear Arms , 
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1536 (2010). 
244 Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice White, Justice O’Connor, Justice 
Scalia, and Justice Kennedy joined.  Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion.  Justice Stevens filed an 
opinion concurring in the judgment.  Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Marshall 
joined; and Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion. 
245 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).  
246 Id. at 279. 
247 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). 
248 Id. at 287 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
249 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., majority opinion). 
250 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (5–4 decision) (Scalia, J., majority opinion).  
251 92 U.S. 524, 548 (1875). 
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Professor Pratheepan Gulasekaram stated that Justice Scalia, who joined in the Verdugo-
Urquidez definition of “the people,” was undoubtedly aware that the Verdugo-Urquidez 
definition left open the possibility that undocumented immigrants may be included in “the 
people.”252  Justice Scalia certainly knew that Heller was the opportune moment to exclude 
undocumented aliens from “the people.”  The shift may appear to be an insignificant tweak, 
or, as one commentator criticized, Justice Scalia’s usual rhetoric,253 but the constraint placed 
on “the people” could have rippling affects on immigration law and constitutional law, and a 
Supreme Court Justice would not act so hastily without so intending.  
The Heller Court’s definition of “the people” accentuates the narrowness of the 
Court’s holding.  In dissent, Justice Stevens acknowledged, while criticizing, the Court’s 
holding that re-defined “the people” as the members of the political community.254  Justice 
Stevens stated that “when the [majority] finally drills down on the substantive meaning of the 
Second Amendment, the Court limits the protected class to law-abiding, responsible 
citizens,”255 which, as Justice Stevens argued, contradicts the Court’s affirmation that “the 
people” protected by the Second Amendment are the same people protected by the First and 
Fourth Amendments. 256   In Six Amendments: How and Why We Should Change the 
Constitution, Justice Stevens explains that Justice Scalia went to great lengths to emphasize 
the restriction of the Heller holding.  Justice Stevens explains that Justice Scalia included the 
exemplary list of constitutional prohibitions on firearm possession to the exaggerate the 
                                                 
252  Gulasekaram, supra note 243, at 1536 (explaining the importance of the Verdugo-Urquidez Court’s 
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253 Matthew Blair, Comment, Constitutional Cheap Shots: Targeting Undocumented Residents with the Second 
Amendment, 9 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 159, 168 (2012) (“A survey of numerous other majority opinions authored 
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254Heller, 554 U.S. at 644 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
255 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
256 Id. 
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shallowness of the Court’s holding, and to make it apparent that the scope of the Second 
Amendment is limited to the scope in which it was enshrined.257  It is obvious that Justice 
Scalia, the chief wordsmith of the Court, 258  intentionally limited the definition of “the 
people.”  To ignore the Heller definition of “the people,” like the Seventh Circuit did in Meza-
Rodriguez, 259 demeans the Court’s authority as the supreme interpreter of the Constitution, 
and it imputes sloppiness into the Supreme Court’s pronouncement of a fundamental right.260  
c. Keeping It the Way It Was and the Way it Is: The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments Do 
Not Expand the Scope of the Second Amendment  
 
All governments must govern impartially and justly, and “the concept of equal justice 
under [the] law is served by the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process, and [] the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”261  The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prevents the 
federal government from denying “any person … life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law …. ”262  The Fourteenth Amendment requires state and local governments to treat all 
                                                 
257 John Paul Stevens, J., Six Amendments: Why and How We Should Change the Constitution  (2014) (excerpt) 
available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-five-extra-words-that-can-fix-the-second-
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world where citizenship as a legal status often matters, casual usage of the term ‘citizen’ to describe rights 
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261 Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 228, 100 (1976) (alteration in original).  
262 U.S CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person … be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law….”). 
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persons similarly situated equally. 263    The concept of equal protection is rooted in the 
American ideal of justice.264   
i. The Fifth Amendment  
The Bill of Rights applies directly to the Federal Government, and Fifth Amendment 
protects certain rights of all aliens in the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, whether 
lawfully or unlawfully present, from abuses by the federal government.265  In Graham v. 
Connor, the Supreme Court declared that if a constitutional provision guarantees a right, then 
an individual cannot claim additional protections of that right under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment.266  When deciding whether undocumented aliens are part of “the 
people” protected by the Second Amendment, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Portillo-
Munoz, noted that undocumented immigrants cannot look to the Fifth Amendment “as an 
additional source of protection for [the] right to keep and bear arms.”267  Challenges brought 
under the Second Amendment must be analyzed under the Second Amendment framework—
not the framework of the Fifth Amendment because the Second Amendment applies directly 
to the federal government.  The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not expand 
the scope of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment, and therefore, it does not 
                                                 
263 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
264 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 288, 242 (1896) (applying the rule of the Equal Protection Clause to 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and stating that the provisions are universal in their applications, and that the 
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265 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 202 (1982); Wong Wing, 163 U.S. 288 (1896). 
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267 634 F.3d 437, 442 n.4 (5th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original).  The Fifth Circuit did not reach the merits of 
the Defendant-Appellant’s claim that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) violated his substantive due process guarantees 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because the court found that he did not properly preserve the claim 
for appeal.  See also id. at 442. 
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entitle all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States the right to keep and 
bear arms. 
ii. The Fourteenth Amendment  
 
The Second Amendment is a distinctive privilege of freedom, 268 is fundamentally 
necessary for the American system of ordered liberty,269 and is incorporated against the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. 270   The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.   In 
accordance with the modern incorporation doctrine, the Second Amendment should have been 
incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and should 
theoretically entitle all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States the right 
to keep and bear arms.271  But, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Supreme Court did not 
reach a majority ruling on the method of incorporation. 272   Even though the Second 
Amendment is incorporated against the States, the Due Process Clause is not necessarily the 
channel for its incorporation. 
Justice Alito, writing for the plurality, relied on stare deices, and incorporated the 
Second Amendment through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  273  
Whereas, Justice Thomas, the critical fifth vote, concurred in the judgment, and incorporated 
the Second Amendment through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which protects the privileges and immunities of citizens.274  The four dissenting 
                                                 
268 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 561 (2010) (Alito, J., majority opinion).  
269 Id. at 778. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. 
272 See generally id. (Alito, J., plurality opinion); id. at 806 (Thomas, J., concurring in part). 
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Justices argued that the Second Amendment should not be incorporated against the States.275  
Since neither the plurality opinion nor the concurring opinion is controlling, and because they 
are logically opposed, neither the Due Process Clause nor the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
are the declared method of incorporation.276   
Since neither clause is the declared method of incorporation, the McDonald holding 
does not mandate that the Second Amendment protect all persons within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States.  Although it could be argued that Justice Alito’s method of 
incorporation is controlling because it is narrower since it adheres to stare decisis, it could 
also be argued that Justice Thomas’s method of incorporation is controlling since it only 
requires that the Second Amendment protect citizens and not all the persons within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.277  Justice Thomas’s method does not expand the 
scope of the Second Amendment, whereas the plurality’s method expands the Second 
Amendment past its original scope.  The failure to reach a majority on the method of 
incorporation did not affect the ruling in McDonald because the four challengers were 
citizens, and thus entitled to the protections of the Second Amendment regardless of the 
method of incorporation.  But, the ruling only applies to citizens,278 and therefore, the issue 
of whether undocumented aliens are protected by the Second Amendment is not affected by 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in McDonald v. City of Chicago.  
C. An Exclusive History: The History of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Excludes 
Undocumented Aliens from the Protective Scope of the Second Amendment  
                                                 
275 See generally id. (Stevens, J., dissenting opinion) (arguing that neither that the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause nor the Due Process Clause should incorporate the Second Amendment); id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
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In the early seventeenth-century, the American colonies flourished under the guiding 
hand of its mother country, Great Britain.  The colonists implemented the entire body of the 
English common law in the New World,279 and they inherited all the natural rights of British 
subjects as if they were born and residing in England, including the right to keep and bear 
arms.280  The English rights and common law were altered to accommodate life in the New 
World,281 but, as Alexis De Tocqueville explained, there was “not an opinion, custom, or law 
… which the point of departure [was] not easily explain[ed].”282  In America, the English right 
to keep and bear arms expanded past its original scope, and the Founders codified the 
expanded right in the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.283 
In 1768, the British army intended to foist an oppressive martial law upon the colonies, 
and the British army tried to disarm the colonists in an effort to impose the martial system.284  
The colonists refused to comply with the British army’s demands, and they revolted.285  After 
defeating the British soldiers in the American Revolution, the colonies declared independence 
in 1776.  During the war, the citizen-militia was the public fortitude, and the American victory 
reinforced the colonists’ confidence and pride in the citizen-militia, 286 and intensified their 
reservations about standing armies.287 
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The Founding Fathers drafted the Second Amendment in response to the widespread 
fear towards standing armies. 288  It was believed that if the constitutional checks on the newly 
established federal government failed, then the citizen-militia would restore order.289  The 
Second Amendment was ratified to prevent the disarmament of the citizen-militia, and it 
implicitly protected the ancient common law right to use arms in self-defense because, as 
Alexander Hamilton stated, “the original right of self defense … is paramount to all positive 
forms of government.”290  The early Americans did not sharply distinguish between personal 
safety and political safety, and therefore, the right to keep and bear arms in service to the 
militia and the right to keep and bear arms in self-defense were inextricably linked, but the 
two rights were legally distinct.291  The common law right was not contingent upon service in 
the militia, but if one was disqualified or excluded from militia service, then he could be 
prohibited from exercising his common law right to bear arms in self-defense, and vice versa. 
To properly define the scope of the Second Amendment, and to specifically determine 
whether undocumented aliens are entitled to the Second Amendment right to keep and bear 
arms, the history of the militia right and common law right to keep and bear arms must be 
analyzed.  Neither the militia right nor the common law right was absolute.  Militia laws 
defined the scope of the right to keep and bear arms in service to the militia,292 and the common 
law defined the scope of the right to keep and bear arms in self-defense.293  Because “[t]he 
Second Amendment codified a pre-existing right, [] it codified a pre-existing understanding 
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of that right[,]”294 and the pre-ratification understanding of the right will illuminate the scope 
of the Second Amendment, as will post-ratification firearm legislation.  The history of the 
right to keep and bear arms excludes undocumented aliens from claiming a space within the 
protective scope of the Second Amendment. 
1. Arming Aliens: Excluding Aliens from the Citizen-Militia 
a. The Body Politic  
During the early Republic, service in the militia was limited to the body politic.295  The 
early American military organization consisted exclusively of citizen-militias that were 
maintained by the States, and which were modeled after the English militia system.296  Each 
colony instituted a militia that composed of white males, between the ages of eighteen and 
sixty, 297  and who were usually employed as farmers, gentry, tradesman, and yeomen. 298  
Control over the militia was localized.  299  Each city, town, or district had its own organization 
and hierarchy, and the militiamen elected the officers.300  The colonial militias served as the 
first defense against internal and external threats, and served as the watch and ward in the 
communities. 301   The militiamen were required to keep and maintain arms at their own 
expense, 302 and were expected to bring their personal arms and ammunition when called into 
service.303  In response to the dangers inherent in the New World, some colonial governments 
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required all households to keep arms. 304   But, pursuant to public safety, the colonial 
governments prohibited certain individuals and groups of people from keeping and using 
arms.  Indians, African American slaves, and non-naturalized aliens, all of whom where not 
citizens, were prohibited from owning arms.305  Indians, slaves, and non-citizen immigrants 
were, like the Catholics in England, a threat to the established order.306  Some colonies even 
disarmed colonists who did not take loyalty oaths, or who did not swear undivided allegiance 
to the colonial governments.307  
During the American Revolutionary War, all persons, including white male citizens, 
were required to pledge their allegiance to the Republic.  If a person did not, then he was 
stripped of his citizenship and disarmed as to prevent him from fighting against the 
Americans, and he could not reclaim his citizenship or weapons until after the State lifted the 
banishment.  Almost every state by July 4, 1776, enacted Test Acts, which required all male 
white citizens to swear allegiance to the commonwealths, to renounce his allegiance to the 
British monarchy, and to swear to not act in any way as to injure the independence of his 
state.308  The Test Acts were enacted pursuant to the principal that “in every free state, 
allegiance and protection [were] reciprocal.”309  By the late eighteenth-century, a “zone of 
immunity” was created, and the right to keep and bear arms became a “birthright” for persons 
who willingly pledged their allegiance to the United States.310  
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Undocumented aliens would undoubtedly be excluded from the Founding era’s citizen-
militia.  Undocumented immigrants do not swear allegiance to the United States as to entitle 
them to all the privileges and immunities of citizenship, including to the right to keep and 
bear arms in defense of the Nation.  The United States offers all immigrants coming to the 
United States the opportunity to naturalize, but undocumented aliens willfully forego the 
opportunity to avail themselves to the full rights and protections of the Constitution.  
Undocumented aliens choose to remain loyal to their homeland, and as a result they are 
protected under international laws, the laws of the United States, and the laws of their home 
countries.  The Supreme Court has explained,  
Each has been offered naturalization, with all of the rights and privileges of 
citizenship, conditioned only upon open and honest assumption of undivided 
allegiance to our Government …. He may claim protection against our Government 
unavailable to the citizens …. [Undocumented] aliens retain[] immunities from 
burden[s] which the citizen[s] must shoulder.  By withholding his allegiance from the 
United States he leaves outstanding a foreign call on his loyalties which international 
law not only permit[s] our Government to recognize [but] … commands [it] to respect 
… They cannot, consistent[] with our international commitments, be compelled to take 
part in the operations of war directed against their own country.  In addition to such 
general immunities they may enjoy particular treaty privileges …. 311 
 
Undocumented aliens, unlike citizens, have no urgency to respond to the call of the 
government.  The United States cannot compel undocumented aliens to respond to its 
demands, and it cannot legally enforce consequences that are consistent with its international 
commitments.312   
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The Second Amendment was designed to “promote liberty through localism  …. ”313  
Militiamen served alongside family, friends, neighbors, and fellow churchgoers,314 but their 
first loyalty and duty was to the Nation.  Although undocumented aliens may have personal 
attachments to people and places within in the country, select personal attachments do not 
automatically translate to national fidelity.  The Supreme Court explained that undocumented 
aliens, 
May be personally loyal to the United States, [but] if his nation becomes our enemy 
his allegiance prevails over personal preference and makes him also our enemy …. So 
long as the alien elects to continue the ambiguity of his allegiance his domain here is 
held [in] precarious tenure315   
 
By virtue of their immigration status, undocumented aliens would be excluded from the 
Founding’s citizen-militia.  
 
 
 
b. Republican Virtue  
The citizen-militia was inherently virtuous because it identified with the citizenry.316  
The idea was that because the citizen-militia comprised of the entire gentry, it reflected the 
common good and integrity of the populace. 317  As the police force, the militia was expected 
to instill civic virtue in society.  The citizen-militia internalized the “everyday mindset of 
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each militiaman,”318 and it was a “local institution, bringing together representative Citizens 
[sic] to preserve popular values of their society.”319  Alexander Hamilton explained that the 
militiamen were bonded by their loyalty to the Nation and to each other, 
Where in the name of common-sense, are our fears to end if we may not trust our sons, 
our brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizens? What shadow of danger can there be 
from men who daily mingling with the rest of the countrymen and who participate in 
the same feeling sentiments, habits and interests?320 
 
The citizen-militia was central to American life before and after the Revolution. 
The ideal militiaman was a man of republican virtue who was “shaped by his myriad 
ties to his community, [which was] the most important for this purpose [of] being [a 
militiaman].”321  Militia service was synonymous with integrity, as it was the duty of the 
militiamen to “stand apart from the state and correct it when it began to fall into corruption.”322  
Militiamen were required to suppress any self-interest, and refuse all perverted demands.323  
Militia service required cooperation among citizens, and participation in self-government. 324  
The citizen-militia idealized freedom by self-government through the use of public arms, and 
it condemned the promotion of individualized self-interest through the use of private arms.325  
Persons deemed “un-virtuous” were stripped of their right to keep and bear arms326  because 
they were a threat to the established order.  Laws were enacted to ensure that they remained 
permanently disarmed.327   
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Undocumented immigrants, by reason of their unlawful immigration status, are not 
“virtuous” citizens, or law-abiding responsible citizens.  Although a generalization, Congress 
has made an empirical decision that undocumented aliens pose a threat to society and to the 
established order.  The Second Circuit crafted an appropriate metaphor, 
Illegal aliens are aliens who have already violated a law of this country.  They are 
subject to deportation.  Moreover, illegal aliens are those who … [are] likely to 
maintain no permanent address in this country, elude detection through an assumed 
identity, and–already living outside the law–resort to illegal activities to maintain a 
livelihood …. [O]ne seeking to arrange an assassination would be especially eager to 
hire someone who had little commitment to this nation’s political institutions and who 
could disappear afterwards without a trace . . . .  328 
 
Although not all undocumented aliens pose a danger to society and not all are unworthy of 
society’s trust, undocumented aliens are already in violation of federal law, and therefore their 
unlawful status is not constitutionally irrelevant.329   Patrick Charles, the recipient of the 2008 
Judge John R. Brown Award for his Second Amendment research, stated, “the founders would 
have publicly accepted the disarming of [even] recidivist violent misdemeanants who 
repeatedly show a disregard for the laws of the community.”330  In light of the historical 
conception of the citizen-militia, unlawful aliens should be excluded from the scope of the 
Second Amendment.   
2. Shooting Bullets at a Natural Right: The Common Law has limited the Scope of the Natural 
Right to Self-Defense  
 
Self-defense is a natural right, and it is common to all persons everywhere. The First 
Congress relied heavily on the work of William Blackstone, whose work is still today the 
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preeminent legal authority.331  Blackstone wrote that there were three primary rights, and five 
auxiliary rights. 332   The three primary rights are the natural rights to personal security, 
personal liberty, and private property.333  The five auxiliary rights are barriers that protect the 
primary rights.334  Blackstone categorized the right to keep and bear arms as the fifth auxiliary 
right.335  
Blackstone accepted the Lockean social contract theory.336  The social contract theory 
requires every person to give up some part of his natural liberty when he enters into a 
structured society.  Each person must forfeit his “power [to] act[] as [he] thinks fit … in 
consideration of receiving the advantages of mutual commerce[,]”337 and he must “conform 
to those laws, which the community has thought properly to establish.”338  Once a person 
conforms, he becomes a member of the political community and he is granted full 
governmental protection.  Blackstone thought that men reserved some rights against the 
political community, 339  and he believed that constitutional rights were absolute. 340   But, 
Blackstone rejected the notion that if the political community violated an individual’s primary 
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rights, then the individual had the absolute right to oppose the community.341  Blackstone 
reasoned that if the political community lacked the authority to judge whether an individual’s 
rights had been violated, then civil society would cease to exist, and it would revert to the 
state of nature.342  Blackstone believed that “civil disobedience is only valid when the public 
voice proclaims such resistance as necessary.”343   
Blackstone taught that society must entrust one branch of government as the supreme 
sovereign power that “acknowledges no superior [power] upon earth.”344   Since the people 
acted through the legislature, Blackstone declared the legislature as the supreme sovereign 
power.  The judiciary was the guardian of the people’s rights, which required it to be 
“subversive of all government.”345  But, the people’s rights were at the will of the legislature, 
and the legislature could lawfully set qualifications and conditions on an individual’s , or 
class’s, ability to exercise the rights.346  Blackstone advised that persons should “have[] arms 
for their defense suitable to their condition and degree, and such as allowed by law …. ”347  
To Blackstone the right to keep and bear arms was “a public allowance under due restrictions 
.… ”348  A man renounced his untrammeled right to self-defense once he left the state of nature 
and entered into civil society. 349  Thus, it is the right of a state to regulate the use and 
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possession of firearms even if such legislation infringes on a person’s natural right to self-
defense.350   
Henry St. George Tucker, the leading commentator during the Founding,351 described 
the Second Amendment as the “true palladium of liberty.”352  Tucker identified an individual’s 
right to keep and bear arms in self-defense in the common law, rather than in the 
Constitution.353  Tucker thought that the right to use arms in self-defense could be lawfully 
regulated by legislation and the common law,354 and since the common law had developed 
differently in each state, the scope of the right to keep and bear arms varied from state to 
state.355  According to Tucker, there was a legal distinction between weapons kept for militia 
service and weapons kept for self-defense, and only militia service weapons enjoyed full 
constitutional protections.356  Weapons kept primarily for individual self-defense were not 
constitutionally protected.  But, they did enjoy some protections under the common law, but 
possession and use of weapons in self-defense were subject to state regulations,357 and often 
completely prohibited.358   
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The Founders believed that to maximize freedom, liberty should be regulated.359  The 
concept of well-regulated liberty is analogous to the modern concept of “ordered liberty.”360   
“Outside a well regulated society governed by the rule of law, liberty was[, and is,] nothing 
more than licentiousness and anarchy.”361  Inherent in the police powers of the states was the 
power to regulate the use of firearms in self-defense.362  The colonies, and then eventually the 
states, had the power to define the scope of the common law right to keep and bear arms in 
self-defense.363  The Second Amendment was intended to restrain arbitrary powers—it was 
not intended to create arbitrary power by entitling all persons with the right to keep and use a 
deadly weapon.  Although the States could not completely eliminate the right to use arms in 
self-defense, the States could severely limit the right pursuant to public safety. 364   The 
common law right to self-defense required “that a person who kills another in his own defense, 
should have retreated as far as he conveniently or safely can, to avoid the violence of the 
assault, before he turns upon his assailant.”365  
 “Self-defense presupposes some means of effectuating that defense.”366  The right to 
keep and bear arms is only one method to preserve the natural right to life, liberty, and 
property.  The natural right to self-defense does not protect the right to use any method 
available for self-defense, and it does not protect the right to use arms in self-defense if certain 
qualifications are not met. 367  Some critics argue that reserving the Second Amendment right 
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to only citizens is illogical, claiming that non-citizens require more self-defense than 
citizens.368  But, the right to use arms in self-defense and the natural right to self-defense are 
two distinct rights, and should not be confused.  Undocumented immigrants are not deprived 
of their natural right to self-defense if they are excluded from the scope of the Second 
Amendment.  There are other means available to defend oneself, and aliens can rely on the 
United States government for protection against immediate threats against their persons.  The 
natural right to self-defense should not be confused with the right to choose a means to 
effectuate self-defense.369  Furthermore, undocumented aliens are not completely prohibited 
from using firearms in self-defense.  Through the political process, the people, if they so 
choose, can grant undocumented aliens a statutory right to keep handguns in their home for 
self-defense.  But, the Seventh Circuit’s holding prevents the people from choosing whether 
undocumented aliens should be granted a statuary right to use firearms in self-defense, and it 
ultimately deprives the people of their right to define the national identity of the United States.  
IV: CONCLUSION 
Justice Scalia stated that the Founding Fathers knew “that societies not only evolve, 
they also rot.”370  If we keep fixing the Constitution to our society’s ideas of fairness and 
equality, the Constitution will eventually snap, and it will become nothing more than an old 
piece of paper.  Inherent in the Constitution is the distinction between citizens and non-
citizens, and only citizens are entitled to all the rights and protections of the Constitution.  If 
courts, like the Seventh Circuit, keep minimizing the difference between citizens and aliens, 
then eventually American citizenship will have no value, and the United States will crumble.     
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